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Abstract 
Over a decade of research has found strong evidence for P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) (“the 
Equation”). We argue, however, that it provides an overly simplified picture due to its inability 
to account for relevance. We manipulated relevance in the evaluation of the probability and 
acceptability of indicative conditionals and found that relevance moderates the effect of P(C|A). 
This corroborates the Default and Penalty Hypothesis put forward in this paper. Finally, the 
probability and acceptability of concessive conditionals (“Even if A, then still C”) were 
investigated and it was found that the Equation provides a better account for concessive 
conditionals than for indicatives across relevance manipulations.  
 Keywords: Indicative conditionals, the New Paradigm, relevance, reasons, concessive 
conditionals, the Equation 
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The Relevance Effect and Conditionals 
In philosophy, there has been a widely shared consensus that Stalnaker’s Hypothesis is 
wrong and that Adams’ Thesis is correct due to formal problems affecting the former but not the 
latter known as the triviality results.   
STALNAKER’S HYPOTHESIS: P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) for all probability distributions where  
P(A) > 0 and ‘If A, then C’ expresses a proposition.  
ADAMS’ THESIS: Acc(if A, then C) = P(C|A) for all simple conditionals (i.e. conditionals whose 
antecedent and consequent clauses are not themselves conditionals), where ‘Acc(if A, then C)’ 
denotes the degree of acceptability of ‘If A, then C’.2  
TRIVIALITY RESULTS: Lewis’ triviality results showed that there is no proposition whose probability is 
equal to P(C|A) for all probability distributions without the latter being subject to trivializing features 
such as that P(C|A) collapses to P(C) or that positive probabilities can only be assigned to two 
pairwise incompatible propositions (Bennett, 2003: ch. 5; Woods, 1997: ch. 4, p. 114-8).   
In psychology, there has been a tendency to endorse a thesis very similar to Stalnaker’s 
hypothesis, known as the Equation, which avoids the problems affecting the former by either 
denying that conditionals express propositions altogether, or by endorsing three-valued de Finetti 
truth tables (Table 1): 
  Table 1. De Finetti Truth Table 




THE EQUATION: P(if A, then C) = P(C|A), but ‘If A, then C’ does not express a classical proposition 
(Bennett, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
                                                 
2  One of the reviewers point out that Adams later abandoned this position in Adams 
(1998). To sidestep such exegetical issues we use the phrase ‘Adams’ Thesis’ to denote the 
position attributed to him in the literature based on his earlier work.  
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At present, the theories united under the heading ‘the New Paradigm of Reasoning’, 
which endorse the Equation, have branched out in different directions. To name just a few, in 
Baratgin, Politzer, and Over (2013), and Politzer, Over, and Baratgin (2010) the Equation is 
studied in relation to three-valued de Finetti truth tables in general and its relation to conditional 
bets is emphasized. In Pfeifer and Kleiter (2011) and Pfeifer (2013), the Equation is endorsed on 
the basis of a coherence based probability logic that works with intervals of imprecise 
probabilities. However, what matters for our purposes is not so much the exact theory in which 
the Equation is embedded but rather the general commitment to the Equation. As it stands, over a 
decade of empirical research has found strong evidence in favor of the Equation and a recent 
study has begun challenging Adams’ Thesis, as nicely outlined in Douven (2015b: ch. 3, 4).   
In contrast, a basic intuition that has emerged repeatedly throughout the history of 
philosophy is that in conditionals like ‘If it rains, then the match will be cancelled’ the 
antecedent and the consequent should somehow be connected or relevant for one another as one 
aspect of the conditionals’ meaning (for references see Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016; Krzyżanowska, 
2015; Douven, 2015b). This intuition is especially salient once confronted with examples in 
which the relevance expectation is violated as in conditionals such as ‘If blood is red, then 
Oxford is in England’, for which the truth value of the antecedent leaves the truth value of the 
consequent unaffected. However, surprisingly this intuitive idea is preserved in none of the 
theories of conditionals currently endorsed in the psychology of reasoning, as we shall see.  
The Paradoxes of the Material Implication 
Before the recent popularity of the Equation in the psychology of reasoning (Evans & 
Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 2013), the dominant theory was mental model 
theory, which is based on the material implication analysis of natural language conditionals 
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(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).3 Since the material implication is true in all other cases than 
when its antecedent is true and its consequent is false, the theory validates the following 
argument schemes that are known to give rise to nonsensical results once natural language 
content is substituted:   
                                                        ¬𝐴
∴ if 𝐴, C                                           𝐶∴ if 𝐴, C                                                [1] 
With no restrictions on the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent, any 
conditional could be inferred from a false antecedent or a true consequent; no matter how odd. 
Hence, from the true premise ‘It is not the case that Europe has been ruled by France since 
Napoleon’ the conditional ‘If Europe has been ruled by France since Napoleon, then the sun 
emits light’ could be inferred. And from the true premise ‘The sun emits light’, the conditional 
‘If Europe has been ruled by France since Napoleon, then the sun emits light’, or indeed ‘If 
Europe was liberated from the occupation by Napoleon’s France, then the sun emits light’ could 
be inferred. Unsurprisingly, participants in psychological experiments tend to find such 
inferences odd as well (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011). Of course, this fact has not escaped the 
proponents of mental model theory. In accounting for the oddness of such inferences, they 
exploit the logical equivalence of the material implication with ‘¬A v C’ and argue that the 
reason why we are reluctant to endorse the valid argument schemes in [1] is really the problem 
with endorsing the following equally valid argument schemes:   
                                                        ¬𝐴
∴  ¬𝐴 v C                                           𝐶∴ ¬𝐴 v C                                                [2] 
                                                 
3  As one of the reviewers points out, mental model theory has most recently been revised 
so as to avoid being committed to the material implication analysis of the natural language 
conditional in Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin (2015). However, we here restrict our 
focus to the previous version of the theory. 
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Since more possibilities are excluded by the premises than by the conclusions in [2], 
information is lost in the conclusion, and according to Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002; Byrne & 
Johnson-Laird, 2009) this is really the source of our intuitive problems with [1]. However, in the 
absence of a prior theoretical commitment to the logical equivalence of natural language 
conditionals to disjunctions, a much more straightforward diagnosis of the oddness of [1] runs as 
follows. The problem is not so much that fewer possibilities are excluded by the conclusion than 
by the premises, but rather that different conditions are imposed by the premises and the 
respective conclusions. The premises are silent on the relationship between A and C and impose 
conditions on a set of possible worlds by being factual propositions; the conclusions impose 
constraints on epistemic states (i.e., that A is to be epistemically relevant for C). 
In contrast, the probabilistic approaches that are currently replacing the mental model 
theory under the heading ‘the New Paradigm of Reasoning’ endorse the Equation and reject [1]. 
The reason given is that the premises do not probabilistically constrain the conclusion when the 
latter is interpreted as a conditional probability as long as 0 < P(premise) < 1 (Bennett, 2003, p. 
139; Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011). However, as 
argued in Skovgaard-Olsen (in press), a case can be made that these theories reject [1] for the 
wrong reasons. The most obvious diagnosis of the oddness of [1] remains that no restrictions on 
the relevance of A for C are introduced by the premises, whereas indicative conditionals fit for 
the speech act of assertions seem to require that A is relevant for C. Yet, these probabilistic 
approaches within the New Paradigm of Reasoning are unable to account for this. According to 
the latter, indicative conditionals should be seen as a linguistic device that makes the participants 
activate a mental algorithm known as the Ramsey test, which consists in temporarily adding the 
antecedent to their knowledge base and evaluating the consequent under its supposition (Evans 
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& Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 2013). As such, indicative conditionals can 
have a high probability of being true as long as P(C) is high even if the antecedent is irrelevant 
for the consequent. Accordingly, none of the main contenders in contemporary psychological 
accounts of conditional reasoning are willing to make relevance part of the core meaning of 
natural language conditionals.4 
P(If A, then C) and Relevance 
The next surprise is that until quite recently,5 when the role of relevance in the 
interpretation of conditionals was empirically investigated it was either found that no support 
could be provided (Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014), 
or that it was only weakly supported by the data (Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & 
Sloman, 2007). So perhaps relevance should be set aside for our theories of conditionals after all. 
In these studies, relevance was operationalized in terms of the ∆p rule, which is well-known 
from the psychological literature on causation, where ∆p > 0 has been taken to be a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for inferring causality (Cheng, 1997). 
THE ∆P RULE: ∆p = P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) 
 As P(C|A) is already occupied as a predictor of P(if A, then C) by the Equation, to obtain 
an orthogonal predictor for the relevance approach P(C|¬A) was chosen in Over et al. (2007) 
and Singmann et al. (2014). The evidence clearly favored P(C|A) as a predictor. However, as 
Spohn (2013: 1092) observes, the ∆p of the stimulus material used in Over et al. (2007) ranged 
                                                 
4  However, it should be noted that Over & Evans (2003) did entertain the possibility that 
relevance could characterize a subgroup of conditionals (i.e. causal conditionals). Yet, this idea 
was later rejected in Over et al. (2007). 
 
5  An exception is Douven, Elqayam, Singmann, Over, & Wijnbergen-Huitink 
(forthcoming). In this study it was found in a novel experimental task that the participants used 
clues about the inferential relations between A and C in evaluating the conditionals used in that 
task.  
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from .23 to .32 and it would thus seem that a fairer test of the relevance approach would cover 
the whole spectrum of positive relevance, irrelevance, and negative relevance:6  
POSITIVE RELEVANCE: ∆p > 0 
IRRELEVANCE: ∆p = 0 
NEGATIVE RELEVANCE: ∆p < 0 
To be sure, Oberauer et al. (2007) did include ∆p = 0 conditions. But in contrast to Over 
et al. (2007), they did not use realistic stimulus material that would enable the participants to 
form their own relevance expectations based on their background knowledge. Instead they 
supplied the participants with frequency information about a deck of cards relating properties in 
artificial relations. Accordingly, it is unclear whether a failure to take relevance into account in 
their study is due to: (a) the independence of the participants’ assessment of P(if A, then C) w.r.t. 
relevance assessments, or (b) the participants’ failure to incorporate novel frequency information 
about artificial stimuli into their degrees of belief in conditionals. Hence, one goal of the present 
study was to use realistic stimuli that activate the participants’ background knowledge while 
measuring P(if A, then C) across systematic manipulations along the relevance dimension. 
 A further issue is that it is not entirely obvious what the relationship between P(if A, then 
C) and relevance should be on the relevance approach to conditionals. Considering ∆p as a 
predictor of P(if A, then C) is not the only option available. Indeed, in Douven (2015a) and 
Olsen (2014: ch. 3; see also Skovgaard-Olsen, 2015) it is suggested that an alternative could also 
provide a solution to the unsolved problem of where the participants’ conditional probabilities 
                                                 
6  In these definitions we follow Spohn (2012: ch. 6, 2013). Importantly, this notion of 
relevance is different from the notion of relevance as introduced by Sperber and Wilson (1986) 
in that it does not attribute a role to processing costs as negatively correlated with perceived 
relevance. In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (draft), further discussion is included of 
how they relate to other popular ideas in the psychological literature like the dual processing 
framework and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory.  
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come from, if we do not want to assume that they are calculated from unconditional probabilities 
using the Kolmogorov ratio definition (i.e. P(C|A) = P(C&A)/P(A)). Pointing to the Ramsey test 
can only be part of the solution, because it does not in itself tell us which psychological 
mechanisms are involved in determining P(C) once A has been added as a supposition to the 
participants’ knowledge base, as recognized by Over et al. (2007): 
Explaining how the Ramsey test is actually implemented—by means of deduction, 
induction, heuristics, causal models, and other processes—is a major challenge, in our 
view, in the psychology of reasoning (p. 63). 
Douven’s (2015a) suggestion is that once A has been added to the knowledge base, assessments 
of the strength of arguments from A to C (given background knowledge) are used in determining 
P(C) in performing the Ramsey test. Olsen’s (2014: ch. 3) suggestion is that heuristic 
assessments of the extent to which A is a predictor of C are used. 
A third possibility, which we propose in this paper, is the Default and Penalty 
Hypothesis. The Default and Penalty Hypothesis holds that in evaluating either P(if A, then C) or 
Acc(if A, then C) the participants evaluate whether A is a sufficient reason for C. Applying the 
explication of the reason relation given in Spohn (2012: ch. 6), this requires at least two things: 
(i) evaluating whether positive relevance is fulfilled and (ii) evaluating P(C|A). The default 
assumption is that positive relevance is given, so the participants jump directly to evaluating 
P(C|A), which explains the existing evidence for the Equation. However, once the default 
assumption of positive relevance is violated, the violation of the participants’ expectations will 
disrupt the equality between P(C|A) and both P(if A, then C) and Acc(if A, then C).  
How exactly this disruption takes place is a matter of further research. Conceptually, the 
idea is that the negative surprise of the lack of positive relevance makes the participants apply a 
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simple penalty applied to P(if A, then C) or Acc(if A, then C) (amounting to a main effect of the 
relevance condition). However, the discovery that A is not a reason for C may also make the 
participants rely less on P(C|A) (amounting to an interaction between the effect of P(C|A) and 
the relevance condition), since P(C|A) is used to assess the sufficiency.     
The Default and Penalty Hypothesis thus describes a heuristic that the participants rely on 
when asking themselves, in one way or another, how plausible the indicative conditional is. 
It can be motivated by the observation that we use conditionals to display and discuss inferential 
relations we are prepared to use in arguments (Fogelin, 1967; Brandom, 2010: 44-8, 104). 
Processing conditionals accordingly makes us expect that an inferential relation is being 
displayed and so we expect that there is a relationship of epistemic relevance between A and C. 
However, this default assumption can, of course, be overridden. Perhaps one way of accounting 
for so-called non-interference conditionals, where there is no apparent connection between A and 
C, is exactly as cases in which the context indicates that this default assumption is to be set aside 
(Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016). That is to say, in these special cases relationships between sentences 
can be displayed that are so absurd in the first place that a rhetorical point is made of either the 
absurdity of the antecedent (e.g. ‘If you can lift that, then I am a monkey’s uncle’) or of that the 
consequent is endorsed come what may (e.g. ‘If it snows in July, the government will fall’). 
However, such non-interference conditionals are the exception and the default assumption is that 
of positive relevance of the antecedent for the consequent. 
One virtue of the last two possibilities of how to relate P(If A, then C) to the relevance 
approach is that each of them offers an explanation for the substantial body of evidence found in 
favor of the Equation. According to Douven’s (2015a) and Olsen’s (2014: ch. 3) suggestion, 
inferential relations and predictor relationships, respectively, play a role in determining P(C|A), 
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which in turn is used in determining P(if A, then C). According to the Default and Penalty 
Hypothesis, upon processing the antecedent with realistic materials7 and the conditional form, 
the participants will by default assume positive relevance of the antecedent for the consequent. 
Hence, as long as we are primarily investigating positive relevance stimulus material then 
participants should jump directly to the second step and evaluate P(if A, then C) solely on the 
basis of P(C|A). But as soon as this tacit assumption of positive relevance is violated, then we 
can experimentally distinguish the Default and Penalty Hypothesis from the Equation. One of the 
goals of the present study is to test this hypothesis. 
Relevance and the Core Meaning of Conditionals 
As the current probabilistic theories of reasoning do not make relevance, or inferential 
relations, part of the core meaning of conditionals, they will have to treat it as a pragmatic 
component that is introduced by contextual factors. One option is to attribute the expectancy of 
the antecedent’s relevance for the consequent to an implicature that arises due to Gricean norms 
                                                 
7  As this indicates, we formulate the Default and Penalty Hypothesis in the first instance 
as a psychological hypothesis concerning the processing of realistic material implementing a 
more general relevance approach to conditionals. How the theory extends to the processing of 
abstract material is an open issue. But one point is clearly that as the stimulus material blocks the 
participants’ ability to make relevance expectations on the basis of their background knowledge, 
they can only rely on the information provided by the experimenters. Accordingly, since false 
antecedent cases fail to supply the participants with useful information for assessing whether A is 
a sufficient reason for C, evaluation of the conditional under these circumstances may provoke a 
presupposition failure. In the literature on presupposition failures in general, it is thought that 
they either make the afflicted sentence false or truth-valueless (Heim and Kratzer, 1998: ch. 4, 
6). Perhaps this accounts for the effect known as ‘the defective truth table’ in the literature, 
which has been taken as evidence for the de Finetti truth table (Evans and Over, 2004). An 
alternative explanation is that participants inclined to a conjunctive reading treat A as a 
presupposition of the indicative conditional. (We owe parts of this argument to discussions with 
Seth Yalcin.) 
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of non-misleading discourse.8 However, as Douven (2015a) points out, it is not entirely obvious 
how exactly the pragmatic mechanism is supposed to work. 
Moreover, as Gricean maxims in the first instance apply to conversational contexts,9 we 
would expect to only find an effect of relevance manipulations on the acceptability of utterances 
in conversational contexts, if this pragmatic explanation were true. In contrast, studies 
investigating P(If A, then C) have been used by proponents of the Ramsey test and the Equation 
to arbitrate between conflicting accounts of the core meaning of conditionals (Over & Evans, 
2003). Hence, we should not expect to find a relevance effect on P(If A, then C), if the latter 
quantity is an indicator of semantic content and expectations of relevance are to be excluded 
from the semantic analysis. On the contrary, if relevance expectations are part of the core 
meaning of conditionals, then we should expect to find a relevance effect in both the P(if A, then 
C) and Acc(if A, then C) conditions.  
It is more difficult to say how evidence of a relevance effect on P(If A, then C) would 
affect the mental model theory. The reason is that the theory has been formulated in such a way 
that the core meaning of conditionals is only investigated directly using abstract stimulus 
materials. When realistic stimulus materials are applied, the theory allows for both pragmatic and 
semantic modulation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). In mental model theory, it is assumed that 
there are different levels of processing conditionals. In the most superficial mode, indicative 
                                                 
8  To be sure, Grice also has a maxim to the effect that one should make one’s 
contributions to the conversation relevant (with an unspecified notion of relevance). However, it 
should be noted that the latter maxim applies to the level of whole speech acts, whereas when we 
are talking about relevance in relation to conditionals, we are dealing with an internal relation 
between the antecedent and the consequent in one sentence. 
 
9  The reason for this qualification is that Douven (2010) has made a case for the claim that 
Gricean maxims of conversation not only apply to conversational contexts but also to individual 
reasoning. 
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conditionals are thought of as being processed as conjunctions by constructing a mental model of 
the first cell of the truth table for the material implication, where both the antecedent and the 
consequent are true (while adding a mental footnote in the form of an ellipsis representing that 
there are further implicit models that would be consistent with the truth of the conditional, which 
distinguishes its mental-model representation from that of a conjunction): 
A      C 
…    
Pragmatic modulation is thought to occur when contextual factors modify the mental models that 
have been constructed of the truth table cells in which the conditional is true. Semantic 
modulation occurs when the content of the antecedent and the consequent modifies the mental 
models that have been constructed of the truth table cells in which the conditional is true. In both 
cases, this can take the form of adding information to the models, preventing the construction of 
models, or by aiding the participant in replacing the mental footnote with an explicit 
representation of all the cases in which the conditional is true.  
However, as it stands the mental model theory has not been formulated in such a manner 
as to generate the general expectation that the antecedent should be epistemically relevant for the 
consequent once natural language content is used. As such it too would be faced with an 
explanatory challenge of how to account for a relevance effect on P(If A, then C) without relying 
on ad hoc principles.  
Concessive Conditionals 
As outlined above, previous studies that did not include a systematic comparison between 
positive relevance, negative relevance, and irrelevance based on realistic materials have not 
found a relevance effect on P(if A, then C). Yet, Douven and Verbrugge (2012) did find that the 
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categorical acceptance of indicative conditionals requires that the antecedent provides evidential 
support for the consequent as a necessary condition, in addition to high conditional probabilities. 
Moreover, in that study it was also found that the evidential support relation could be used to 
differentiate between the acceptability of indicative conditionals and concessive conditionals 
such as ‘Even if it rains, then Michael will still go outside for a smoke’. Accordingly, a further 
goal of the present study is to investigate whether these findings can be extended from the case 
of categorical acceptability to quantitative degrees of acceptability.  
In Skovgaard-Olsen (in press), it was suggested that concessive conditionals could be 
used to deny that A is a sufficient reason against C in contexts where there is a presupposition of 
A being a reason against C. This can occur either because the speaker denies that A is a sufficient 
reason against C or because the speaker denies that A is a reason against C—perhaps because A 
is taken to be irrelevant for or indeed to constitute a reason for C by the speaker. So whereas the 
Default and Penalty Hypothesis makes us predict that the participants will find indicative 
conditionals defective in the negative relevance and irrelevance conditions, there should in 
general be nothing defective about the use of concessive conditionals under these conditions. The 
exception is, of course, when P(C|A) = low and A is indeed a sufficient reason against C.  
We can distinguish two versions of this hypothesis about concessive conditionals. On one 
version the concessive conditional simply expresses the denial of A being a good objection 
against C, if A were true (i.e., P(C|A) ≠ low). On another version, the concessive conditional 
expresses an unconditional commitment to C and the assumption that the degree of justification 
for C would be stable with respect to the truth of A (i.e., P(C) = high and P(C|A) ≠ low). On this 
latter proposal, the unconditional commitment to C distinguishes concessive conditionals from 
indicative conditionals. In the case of the indicative conditional, ‘If A, then C’, we adopt a 
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conditional commitment to C under the supposition that A is true, because A is viewed as a 
sufficient reason for C. In the case of the concessive ‘Even if A, then (still) C’, we retain an 
unconditional commitment to C even if A is true, because it is denied that A is a good objection 
against C. For both of these proposals, it might appear a bit redundant to deny that A is a good 
objection against C when it is obvious that A is either irrelevant or positively relevant for C. But 
strictly speaking one would not be committing an epistemic error doing so, because it is after all 
true that C would not be undermined by the truth of A, if A raises the probability of C (∆p > 0) 
or leaves it unchanged (∆p = 0).  
Igor Douven (personal communication, September, 2015) notes in relation to the second 
version of the hypothesis about concessive conditionals that it may actually fit the non-
interference conditionals we encountered above (e.g. ‘If it snows in July, the government will 
fall’) better than concessive conditionals. In the case of non-interference conditionals, 
substitution of ‘whether or not’, ‘regardless of whether’, and sometimes ‘even if’ for ‘if’ makes 
little difference to their assertability (Douven, 2015b: 11). Accordingly, it should be possible to 
test whether the participants are interpreting a given concessive as a non-interference conditional 
by testing their sensitivity to such substitutions. In our Experiment below, we will, however, only 
be testing the first version of the hypothesis about concessive conditionals, which is more clearly 
distinguished from non-interference conditionals. 
 
The Current Experiment 
A general lesson of the discussion above is that if we want to make progress on the issue 
of whether expectations of epistemic relevance should be included in the core meaning of 
indicative conditionals, then we should use realistic stimulus material that allows the participants 
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to form expectations about relevance and systematically violate those expectations through 
manipulations of relevance that also implement conditions of negative relevance and irrelevance. 
This is done in the following experiment. As discussed above, we predict that for the case of 
indicative conditionals we find an effect of the relevance condition: for positive relevance (PO) 
the Equation holds whereas for irrelevance (IR) and negative relevance (NE) it does not hold. In 
contrast, for concessive conditionals we predict no such effect. Here the Equation is expected to 
hold throughout, for all three relevance conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted over the Internet to obtain a large and demographically 
diverse sample. A total of 577 people completed the experiment. The participants were sampled 
through the internet platform www.Crowdflower.com from USA, UK, and Australia and were 
paid a small amount of money for their participation.   
The following exclusion criteria were used: not having English as native language, failing 
to answer two simple SAT comprehension questions correctly in a warm-up phase, completing 
the task in less than 160 seconds or in more than 3600 seconds, and answering ‘not serious at all’ 
to the question of how serious they would take their participation at the beginning of the study. 
The final sample consisted of 348 participants: 94 were assigned to the P(if A, then C) condition, 
89 to the Acc(if A, then C) condition, 78 to the P(Even if A, then still C) condition, and 87 were 
assigned to the Acc(Even if A, then still C) group (see below). Mean age was 37.2 years, ranging 
from 17 to 72 years; 39.4 % of the participants were male; 57.8 % indicated that the highest level 
of education that they had completed was an undergraduate degree or higher. 
Design 
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The experiment implemented a mixed design. There were two factors that were varied 
within participants: relevance (with three levels: PO, NE, IR), and priors (with four levels: HH, 
HL, LH, LL, meaning, for example, that P(A) = high and P(C) = low for HL). The prior 
manipulation had the goal of increasing the spread of the conditional probability of the 
consequent given the antecedent. This ensured a robust estimation of the relationship with the 
dependent variables. Two further factors were varied between participants leading to the four 
experimental groups: conditionals with two levels, indicative (‘if A, then C’) and concessive 
(‘Even if A, then still C’); and mode of evaluation with two levels, probability and acceptability.  
Materials and Procedure  
Participants were randomly assigned to the four experimental groups. The 12 within-
participants conditions were randomly assigned to 12 different scenarios for each participant. 
More specifically, we performed a large prestudy (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., draft) in which we 
measured prior probabilities and perceived relevance for a set of 24 scenarios from which we 
obtained the 12 different scenarios employed here. From each of the 12 selected scenarios we 
could construe all 12 within-participant conditions. Consequently, mapping of condition to 
scenario was counterbalanced across participants preventing confounds of condition and content.  
To reduce the dropout rate once the proper experiment started, participants first went 
through three pages stating academic affiliations, asking for personalized information (that was 
not paired with their responses, however), posing two SAT comprehension questions in a warm-
up phase, and presenting a seriousness check about how careful the participants would be in their 
responses (Reips, 2002). Following this, the experiment itself began with the presentation of the 
12 within-participants conditions. Their order was randomized anew for each participant. 
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For each of the 12 within-participants conditions, the participants were presented with 
three pages. The (randomly chosen) scenario text was placed at the top of each page. One 
participant might thus see the following scenario text:  
Sophia's scenario: Sophia wishes to find a nice present for her 13-year-old son, Tim, for 
Christmas. She is running on a tight budget, but she knows that Tim loves participating in 
live roleplaying in the forest and she is really skilled at sewing the orc costumes he needs. 
Unfortunately, she will not be able to afford the leather parts that such costumes usually 
have, but she will still be able to make them look nice. 
The underlying idea was to use brief scenario texts concerning basic causal, functional, or 
behavioral information that uniformly activates stereotypical assumptions about the relevance 
and prior probabilities of the antecedent and the consequent of 12 conditionals that implement 
our experimental conditions for each scenario. So to introduce the 12 experimental conditions for 
the scenario text above we, inter alia, exploited the fact that the participants would assume that 
receiving things belonging to orc costumes would raise the probability of Tim being excited 
about his present (PO), receiving a Barbie doll would lower the probability of Tim being excited 
about his present (NE), and that whether Sophia regularly wears shoes would leave the 
probability of Tim being excited about his present unchanged (IR). A pretest with 725 
participants reported in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (draft) showed that the average ∆p was .32 for the 
positive relevance conditions, -.27 for the negative relevance conditions, and -.01 for our 
irrelevance conditions.  
On the first page of each within-participant condition, the scenario text was followed by 
two questions presented in random order. One of those questions measured the conditional 
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probability of the consequent given the antecedent, which is here illustrated for the NE LH 
condition (= negative relevance, P(A) = low, P(C) = high) for the scenario text above: 
Suppose Sophia buys a Barbie doll for Tim. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the following sentence is true on a scale 
from 0 to 100%: 
Tim will be excited about his present. 
The other question measured the probability of the conjunction of the antecedent and the 
consequent. We included this question to measure the probability of the premise of an inference 
task presented on the third page of the study. On the second page, the scenario text was either 
followed by a question asking the participants to evaluate P(if A, then C), Acc(If A, then C), 
P(Even if A, then still C), or Acc(Even if A, then still C), depending on which experimental 
group they were in:  
Could you please rate the probability that the following sentence is true on a scale from 0 
to 100 %: 
IF Sophia buys a Barbie doll for Tim, THEN Tim will be excited about his present. 
If the participants were in one of the acceptability groups (i.e., Acc(If A, then C) or Acc(Even if 
A, then still C)), and it was their first scenario then they would first receive the following 
instruction:  
When we ask - here and throughout the study - how 'acceptable' a statement is, we are not 
interested in whether the statement is grammatically correct, unsurprising, or whether it 
would offend anybody. Rather we ask you to make a judgment about the adequacy of the 
information conveyed by the statement. More specifically, we ask you to judge whether 
the statement would be a reasonable thing to say in the context provided by the scenarios.  
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On the third page, the participants were presented with a short argument with the conditional as 
the conclusion. The results of that task are not reported here.  
Thus, for each of the 12 within-participants conditions, each mapped on a different 
scenario, participants went through 3 pages. For each question, the participants were instructed to 
give their responses using sliders ranging from 0% to 100%. The full list of scenarios, the raw 
data, the data preparation script, and the analysis script can all be found in the supplemental 
materials at https://osf.io/j4swp/. 
Results 
Figures 1 and 3 provide an overview of the data per mode of evaluation and relevance 
condition with the estimated conditional probability P(C|A) on the x-axis and the dependent 
variables (either P(if A, then C), Acc(if A, then C),  P(Even if A, then still C), or Acc(Even if A, 
then still C)) on the y-axis (similar plots further divided as a function of prior manipulation are 
provided in the supplemental materials, they essentially show the same pattern, albeit with more 
noise). Regarding the statistical analysis it is important to note that the data has replicates on 
both the level of participant (each participant provided one response for each of the twelve 
within-participants conditions; i.e., four responses per relevance condition) as well as on the 
level of the scenario (each scenario could appear in each relevance condition; we obtained 
between 19 and 41 responses for each scenario-by-relevance-condition combination across all 
four groups). This dependency structure with conditions repeated within participants and 
scenarios can be accommodated by a linear mixed model (LMM) analysis with crossed random 
effects for participants and scenarios (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). Details of the model 
specification can be found in the Appendix. 
Indicative Conditionals 
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Figure 1. Raw data values (plotted with 80% transparency) and LMM estimated linear effect of 
P(C|A) as a predictor on Acc(if A, then C) (upper row) and P(if A, then C) (lower row) across 
relevance manipulations (PO = left column, NE = center column, IR = right column). The confidence 
band show the 95% confidence region of the effect of P(C|A). 
 
Inspection of Figure 1 seems to support our first hypothesis; for indicative conditionals 
the relevance condition seemed to affect the results but the mode of evaluation (P(if A, then C) 
vs. Acc(if A, then C)) seemed to have little influence. In the PO condition the agreement 
between the conditional probability and the dependent variable seemed to be very strong. If it 
were not for some data point in the upper left corners the agreement would have been perfect and 
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the regression line would have lied exactly on the main diagonal. However, in the other two 
conditions this relationship seemed much weaker, mainly because of a larger cluster of data 
points in the lower right corners. In addition, there seemed to be a difference in intercept, the 
overall level of responses to the dependent variable seemed to be considerably lower in the NE 
and IR condition compared to the PO condition.  
This pattern was confirmed in an LMM analysis with fully crossed fixed effects for the 
conditional probability P(C|A), relevance condition (PO, NE, and IR), and mode of evaluation 
(P(if A, then C) and Acc(if A, then C)). Interestingly, this LMM showed no effects of mode of 
evaluation, all F < 1, p > .4, indicating that the probability of the conditional was judged exactly 
as the acceptability of the conditional. We found a main effect of conditional probability, F(1, 
61.96) = 597.00, p < .0001, which was further qualified by an interaction of conditional 
probability and relevance condition, F(2, 35.18) = 21.13, p < .0001. Follow up analysis on the 
interaction showed that the slope in the PO condition (b = 0.78, 95%-CI = [0.71, 0.85]) was 
significantly larger than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.61, 95%-CI = [0.52, 0.71]), t(41.53) 
= 3.26, pH = .00410, as well as significantly larger than the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.43, 
95%-CI = [0.35, 0.52]), t(53.13)= 6.22, pH < .0001. Additionally, the slopes from the NE and IR 
conditions also differed significantly from each other, t(22.33) = 2.62, pH = .02.  
In other words, in the PO condition an increase in perceived conditional probability by 
1% lead to an increase of around 0.8% in the perceived probability or acceptability of the 
conditional, an almost perfect relationship. In the other conditions the same increase in perceived 
                                                 
10  We controlled for the family-wise error rate of follow-up tests, for each set of follow-up 
tests separately, using the Bonferroni-Holm correction (indicated by the index "H"). 
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conditional probability led to a markedly lower increase in the perceived probability or 
acceptability of the conditional of 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. 
We also found a main effect of relevance condition, F(2, 26.63) = 89.50, p < .0001, 
indicating that the level of perceived probability or acceptability of the conditional differed 
across the three conditions. However, given the significant interaction with conditional 
probability the pattern was slightly less simple. Across the conditional probability scale, PO 
conditionals received higher ratings than both NE and IR conditionals, t > 4.56, pH < .0002. 
However, while there was clearly no difference between NE and IR at the far left of the scale 
(i.e., at 0%), t(11.92) = -0.68, pH = .51, there was a difference at the midpoint of the scale (i.e., at 
50%), t(19.22) = 2.50, pH = .049, as well as at the far right end of the scale (i.e., at 100%), 
t(19.55) = 2.63, pH = .049. The estimated marginal means [EMM] were PO = 19.3%, NE = 3.3%, 
and IR = 4.3% at 0%, PO = 58.4%, NE = 34.0%, and IR = 26.0% at 50%, and PO = 97.4%, NE = 
64.6%, and IR = 47.7% at 100%. 
A careful inspection of Figure 1 suggested that there was a further difference between the 
three relevance conditions. The effect of conditional probability on the dependent variable 
seemed to be quite uniform across participants in the positive relevance condition. In contrast, in 
the other two conditions there seemed to be more inter-individual variability in the slope, some 
participants seemed to maintain a slope of one (i.e., their responses lie on the main diagonal) 
whereas other decreased the slope. This decrease seemed to be specifically strong in the 
irrelevance condition where some slopes seemed to be at zero. To assess this hypothesis Figure 2 
(upper row) plots the distribution of individual slope estimates derived from the LMM. As can be 
seen, the distribution of conditional probability slopes in the PO condition is clearly peaked 
whereas the one in the IR condition is a lot flatter with (at least) one rather weak peak at 0. This 
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is supported by the empirical standard deviations of the individual slopes estimates, 0.23 in the 
PO condition, 0.25 in the NE condition, and 0.31 in the IR condition, as well as by the empirical 
kurtosis,11 0.96 in the PO condition, -0.93 in the NE condition, and -1.21 in the IR condition. To 
ensure the distribution of random effects is not an artifact of the hierarchical modeling approach, 
as it shrinks extreme estimates toward the mean estimate, we also estimated separate regressions 
for each individual and relevance condition. This analysis essentially showed the same pattern of 
results (see supplemental materials).   
 
                                                 
11  “For symmetric unimodal distributions, positive kurtosis indicates heavy tails and peakedness relative to 
the normal distribution, whereas negative kurtosis indicates light tails and flatness” (DeCarlo, 1997, p. 292). 
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Figure 2. Individual slope estimates for the effect of conditional probability P(C|A) on the dependent variable across 
conditions. These estimates are derived from the random effects terms of the LMM. In each plot each participant 





Figure 3. Raw data values (plotted with 80% transparency) and LMM estimated linear effect of 
P(C|A) as a predictor on Acc(Even if A, then still C) (upper row) and P(Even if A, then still C)  (lower 
row) across relevance manipulations (PO = left column, NE = center column, IR = right column). The 
confidence band show the 95% confidence region of the effect of P(C|A).  
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Inspection of Figure 3 suggests a more homogenous pattern for the concessive 
conditionals. With small exceptions in the PO conditions the agreement between the conditional 
probability and the dependent variable was almost perfect. There hardly seemed to be any other 
effect. This was supported by a LMM with the same structure as for the indicative conditionals 
which revealed a main effect of conditional probability, F(1, 23.04) = 874.72, p < .0001, but no 
interaction of conditional probability with relevance condition, F(2, 19.47) = 2.23, p = .13. The 
overall effect of conditional probability was b = 0.78, 95%-CI [0.73, 0.83], again suggesting that 
an increase in conditional probability of 1% results in an increase in probability or acceptability 
of the concessive conditional of around 0.8%, but this time for all three relevance conditions. As 
before, there was no effect of mode of evaluation, all F < 2.4, p > .11. We also found a small 
main effect of relevance condition, F(2, 14.89) = 3.99, p = .04. Follow-up analysis revealed that 
(at the midpoint of the conditional probability scale) PO conditionals (EMM = 53.5%) received 
higher ratings than NE conditionals (EMM = 45.5%), t(18.27) = 2.94, pH = .03. IR conditionals 
(EMM = 48.9%), however, differed from neither of the other conditions, |t| < 1.9, pH > .16.12 The 
distribution of individual conditional probability effects (Figure 2, lower row) shows clearly 
peaked distribution with the largest variability for PO (SD = 0.18), followed by NE (SD = 0.12), 
and IR (SD = 0.08) and positive kurtosis in each case (PO = 0.96; NE = 1.14; IR = 4.94).  
 
                                                 
12  When analyzing the effect of relevance condition at both ends of the scale separately we 
found that at the left end (i.e., 0%), PO conditionals received higher ratings than NE (pH = .02) 
and IR differed from neither (pH > .32), whereas there was no difference between the three 
conditions at the right end of the scale (i.e., 100%), all pH > .99. Note also that the interaction of 
conditional probability and relevance was not significant so that not too much weight should be 
attached to the differences of effects at different scale positions. 
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Discussion 
As we have seen in the introduction, earlier studies that did not systematically contrast 
PO, NE, and IR stimulus material failed to find a relevance effect on indicative conditionals. In 
contrast, we introduced this manipulation and our results indicate that relevance affects the rating 
of the probability and the acceptability of indicative conditionals. These findings corroborate the 
predictions of the Default and Penalty Hypothesis that participants make a default assumption of 
positive relevance when processing the antecedent and the ‘If…, then…’ form with realistic 
material. As long as this assumption is fulfilled, reasoners proceed to the second step of the 
evaluation of whether A is a sufficient reason for C by evaluating whether P(C|A) = high. Yet, 
when the participants’ expectations of positive relevance are violated in the irrelevance or 
negative relevance conditions, they react to the perceived defect of the indicatives by providing 
lower ratings and by showing less sensitivity to P(C|A). The analysis of the random effects 
estimates of the LMM reveals, however, that there is quite some individual variability present in 
the interaction between relevance and P(C|A). As shown in Figure 2 (upper row), there appears 
to be a minority for whom P(C|A) continues to have a steep slope even in the irrelevance 
condition while P(C|A) has either a weak relationship, or no relationship at all, for the other 
participants in the irrelevance conditions for indicative conditionals. 
Both Adams’ Thesis and the Equation are challenged by these findings. To account for 
the effects, the proponents of the Equation would have to attribute the relevance effect to 
pragmatic modulation.13 For the Acc(If A, then C) group this might be accomplished by 
                                                 
13  A case could be made that this strategy is not available to the proponents of Adams’ 
Thesis. After all, if Gricean maxims are required to account for a relevance effect on our 
judgments of the acceptability of indicatives, then presumably they should also enter explicitly 
into the theory for it to be descriptive of acceptability conditions.    
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invoking Gricean maxims of conversation as the instructions explicitly introduced a 
conversational context. Yet, the same strategy cannot be applied to account for a relevance effect 
in the P(If A, then C) group—unless it is assumed that pragmatic factors are implicitly infused in 
the experimental task.  
However, adopting this latter interpretation would put the proponents of the Equation in a 
somewhat odd dialectical position. On the one hand, studies investigating P(If A, then C) have 
been used as direct evidence against the mental model theory to show that it got the core 
meaning of natural language conditionals wrong as the dominant response is P(If A, then C) = 
P(C|A) (Over & Evans, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004). On the other hand, this fictive opponent 
would now insist that the same type of task, which was once used to arbitrate in disputes over the 
core meaning of conditionals, could no longer be interpreted as an investigation of semantic 
content in the absence of pragmatic factors now that a relevance effect was found. Of course, the 
immediate problem would then be to explain what is to prevent the proponents of the mental 
model theory of using the same dialectical strategy to account for the evidence for P(If A, then 
C) = P(C|A) by claiming that it arose merely due to an infusion of pragmatic factors into the core 
meaning of the natural language conditional, which continues to be given by the material 
implication. Furthermore, we may note that if adopting this strategy is to avoid having the 
appearance of an ad hoc attempt to dodge an unpleasant objection, then the burden of 
justification is on those engaging in this line of defense to produce positive experimental 
evidence that this is indeed what is happening in the concrete task under the relevance 
manipulations. 
To be sure, the issue of how to find a theory-neutral way of operationalizing the 
distinction between semantic and pragmatic content continues to be a vexing problem. Part of the 
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reason is that the distinction persists in being deeply controversial in both the philosophical and 
linguistic literature on purely theoretical grounds (Bach, 1997, Birner, 2013: ch. 3). However, 
until this theoretical dispute is resolved, we propose to adopt the following strategy: to interpret 
our results as minimally raising an explanatory challenge to proponents of the Equation. If 
investigations of P(If A, then C) can be used to challenge and replace one theory of the core 
meaning of conditionals, then it seems legitimate to use the same task for documenting a 
relevance effect on the core meaning of conditionals. 
As we have noted, the dialectical situation is somewhat different when it comes to the 
mental model theory, insofar as it holds that the core meaning of conditionals is to be 
investigated through the use of abstract stimulus materials. (In contrast, the Equation has been 
defended on the basis of tasks that use abstract and realistic materials interchangeably, Over & 
Evans, 2003.) However, the mental model theory is likewise presented with an explanatory 
challenge of showing how semantic modulation gives rise to the general expectation of positive, 
epistemic relevance of the antecedent for the consequent based on systematic principles, since its 
preferred account of the core meaning of conditionals ignores relevance considerations 
altogether.  
Turning to our results concerning the concessive conditional, it is somewhat ironic that 
the present results indicate that P(C|A) is actually a better predictor of P(Even if A, then still C) 
than of P(If A, then C) across relevance manipulations. This is ironic since the Equation and the 
Ramsey Test were advanced as explanatory hypotheses concerning indicative conditionals 
specifically that were silent on concessive conditionals. In contrast, it was predicted by our 
account that there would be a defect affecting indicative conditionals but not concessive 
conditionals in the irrelevance and negative relevance conditions. The reason we gave was that 
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concessive conditionals deny that A is a good objection against C. For the negative relevance 
condition this requires that P(C|A) does not have a low probability. So here this qualitative 
analysis coincides with an account that uses P(C|A) as a predictor of the probability or 
acceptability of ‘Even if A, then still C’. What is a bit surprising, however, is that the 
acceptability ratings of the concessive were still high in the positive relevance condition as the 
denial of A being a good objection against C seems to be a bit redundant when A is actually a 
reason for C. Indeed, Douven and Verbrugge (2012: 485) think that a categorical acceptance of 
the concessive is positively odd for the positive relevance condition. But strictly speaking, the 
denial continues to be accurate under this condition as A is not a good objection against C, if A 
in fact raises the probability of C.     
In their investigation of the categorical acceptance of indicative and concessive 
conditionals, Douven and Verbrugge (2012) found that there was a tendency to accept the 
indicative conditional in positive relevance conversational contexts, whereas there was a 
tendency to accept the concessive conditional in negative relevance or irrelevance conversational 
contexts. In contrast, we found little difference between the degree of Acc(Even if A, then still 
C) across PO, NE, and IR. However, in comparing these results it must be kept in mind that 
Douven and Verbrugge (2012) were investigating comparative judgments of the categorical 
acceptance of indicative conditionals versus concessive conditionals across relevance 
manipulations, whereas we are making between-subjects comparisons of the absolute degrees of 
acceptance of indicative conditionals and concessive conditionals across relevance 
manipulations. So when they found only a small group of participants accepting the concessive 
in the PO condition, then this may simply be because their participants had the choice of 
selecting the indicative instead. In contrast, our study involved a between groups comparison. So 
Running head: THE RELEVANCE EFFECT AND CONDITIONALS                                  31 
we are not asking for comparative judgments between concessives and indicatives. This might 
explain why there is a difference in how acceptable the concessive was found to be in the PO 
condition across the two studies.   
Douven and Verbrugge (2010) report differences between the acceptability and 
probability of indicative conditionals when contrasting conditionals with inductive, abductive, 
and deductive inferential relations between the antecedents and consequents. In light of these 
findings, it is somewhat surprising that no differences between the probability and acceptability 
of both the indicative and concessive conditionals were found in our experiment. However, as 
Douven (personal communication, November, 2015) points out, one explanation might be that 
the differences were most marked for conditionals expressing inductive relations (where the 
connection is based on purely frequentist information), whereas the positive relevance 
conditionals we investigated seemed to be more of an abductive character. Their findings suggest 
that the type of inferential relation may exercise an influence on the assessment of the reason 
relationship. But as Douven and Verbrugge (2012) readily admit, it is difficult coming up with a 
deeper understanding of their findings in the absence of a more detailed account of the 
processing of deductive, inductive, and abductive inferential relations. 
A final thing that may be viewed as surprising about our results is that the Equation only 
seemed to hold in the positive relevance case. Yet, as Igor Douven (personal communication, 
September, 2015) points out the triviality results seem to show that P(If A, then C) = P(C|A) 
entails the probabilistic independence of the antecedent and the consequent. So it may be viewed 
as surprising that it was found in our experiment that the Equation only holds when the 
antecedent is probabilistically dependent on the consequent. However, as Douven and Verbrugge 
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(2013) point out, the triviality results actually rely on the following assumption, which is 
stronger than the Equation:  
GENERALIZED EQUATION: P(if φ, then ψ|χ) = P(ψ|φ, χ), for any ψ, φ, χ such that P(φ, χ) > 0 
And in their experiments Douven and Verbrugge (2013) found evidence that this stronger 
assumption fails to hold for normal conditionals. Whether this is the right explanation is up for 
further research to decide. 
 
Conclusion 
For more than a decade of research it has been found that the Equation (P(If A, then C) = 
P(C|A)) has received strong empirical support. Moreover, not only do the prevalent theories in 
the psychology of reasoning not make the expectation of relevance of the antecedent for the 
consequent part of the core meaning of conditionals, but previous studies also appear to suggest 
that the presence of such an expectation is not supported by the data.  
In the present study, results were presented that challenge this consensus by showing a 
relevance effect on P(If A, then C). This raises an explanatory challenge for psychological 
theories of conditionals like the recent probabilistic theories and the mental model theory, which 
deny that relevance plays a role for the core meaning of indicative conditionals. Moreover, it was 
found that P(C|A) actually provides a better predictor of the probability and acceptability of 
concessive conditionals than for indicative conditionals across relevance manipulations. This 
new finding is also surprising given that the probabilistic theories use P(C|A) as their main 
predictor for indicative conditionals, but have so far been silent on concessive conditionals. 
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Appendix: Details of the LMM Analysis 
All analysis were performed using lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) for 
the statistical programming language R (R Core Team, 2015). To ease interpretation of the 
numerical covariate P(C|A), we centered it and the dependent variable on the midpoint of the 
scale (at 50%). For numerical stability in the estimation we also divided both by 100 so that all 
variables were on the scale from -1 to 1 (as factors were coded with 1 and -1). We followed the 
suggestions of Barr et al. (2013) and employed the maximal random effects structure as detailed 
below. Tests of fixed effects were Wald-tests using the Kenward-Roger approximation for 
degrees of freedom (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Follow-up analyses were based on the 
methods implemented in lsmeans (Lenth, 2015) and also employed the Kenward-Roger 
approximation for deriving standard errors and degrees of freedom.  
Each of the LMMs (one for the indicative and one for the concessive conditionals) had 
crossed random effects for participants and scenario. For participants, we estimated random 
intercepts as well as by-participant random slopes for P(C|A), relevance condition, and their 
interaction. For scenarios we also estimated random intercepts as well as by-scenario random 
slopes for P(C|A), relevance condition, mode of evaluation, as well as all corresponding 
interactions. We also estimated all correlations among random effects for both the by-participant 
random effects as well as the by-scenarios random effects. Note that we did not estimate random 
slopes for the prior manipulation for either random effects term. This followed the consideration 
that the prior was only manipulated to achieve a certain spread of conditional probabilities in 
each relevance manipulation. Furthermore, including random slopes for the priors would have 
prevented us from estimating random slopes for the conditional probabilities in each relevance 
condition (as such a model would have been oversaturated), which were of substantive interest in 
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the present study (see Figure 2). For an analysis of the effect of the priors see the supplemental 
materials. 
 
